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Multiculturalism versus Assimilation: Attitudes towards Immigrants in Western Countries

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Abstract

A long standing area of debate in Western countries is that of the appropriate philosophy for facilitating large scale immigration; should immigrants preserve their traditions and culture while living in the host country (integration/multiculturalism) or should they assimilate themselves into the ways and manners of their hosts? The ways that nations go about resolving this issue goes to the heart of internal policy formulation on immigration but is also influential to the image that the country projects overseas. Countries are often labeled according to the official views of their Governments. For example, France might be classed as essentially assimilationist and Britain as multi-cultural, whereas the Netherlands and Germany might be seen as somewhere between the two, but how did these policy differences come about and do they accurately reflect the views of the majority of residents of the various countries? This paper addresses part of this issue by seeking to identify and analyse the characteristics of those people in Western countries who think that immigrants should assimilate culturally and how they differ from those who think that immigrants should preserve a separate cultural existence? By doing so, it seeks to explain why these inter-country differences in views exist and whether they are caused primarily by attribute effects (the composition of the population) or by coefficient effects (the strength of the views they hold). This study exploits a unique set of data provided by The Human Beliefs and Values Survey to identify and to estimate the strength of those factors which lead people to favour cultural integration over multiculturalism for immigrants. In doing so, it provides Governments with a snapshot of contemporary views on this increasingly important issue and how these views may shift as demographic characteristics alter.

Keywords: Immigrants, Multiculturalism, Assimilation, Western Countries, Logit, Decomposition.

JEL classification: J61, F22

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1. Introduction

Tolerance of inter-personal behavioural differences is the *leitmotif* of Western society: many Western countries are major aid donors, most are high net recipients of immigrants, and all are signatories to a number of United Nations charters which repudiate discrimination and persecution and guarantee human rights. Yet, despite this reputation for liberalism, there can be little doubt that, in the past decade or so within Western countries, there is an increasing awareness of, and a hardening of attitudes towards people who are 'different' and, in particular, towards immigrants. The rise to electoral prominence in several of these countries of right-wing parties, with explicitly anti-foreigner agendas, is testimony to this. Arguments about the wearing of the Muslim veil in Britain, and the headscarf in France are part of a wider debate taking place across Europe – embracing *inter alia* the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Denmark, Italy, and Switzerland - about the erosion of national identity through the steady drip of special demands predicated on tolerance for cultural diversity[1].

A central pillar of the debate in Western countries about immigrants concerns the relative merits of multiculturalism versus assimilation: should immigrants preserve their traditions and culture while living in the host country or should they absorb themselves into the ways and manners of their hosts[2]? Of course, in practice, the distinction between the two need not be as stark. Within the two polar cases of multiculturalism and assimilation there are various degrees of integration and coexistence[3]. Integration provides for the coexistence of minority cultures with the majority culture. Assimilation requires the absorption of minority cultures into the majority culture. In simplistic terms the aim of assimilation is a monocultural, perhaps even a monofaith, society; the aim of integration is a multicultural, pluralist society[4]. Historically, there was a belief that that all immigrants would become assimilated in some way; either strict assimilation in which immigrants adopted the majority culture or in a US-style melting pot situation whereby minority and majority cultures merged to form a new entity, still predominantly majority culture but with a significant cultural input from the more recent arrivals. The proviso here was that all were expected to share a strong national identity as Americans[5]. This later situation may be described as partial assimilation with the preconditions being the new arrivals adopted the language, observed the law and contributed economically to the host country, while at the same time being free to observe customs and traditions, where these were deemed compatible with the established mainstream values of the host country. In practice, this is the type of system that emerged in a number of European countries. The basic problem with this system is that assimilation of any dimension is the result of the interaction of two factors that may not coincide or be mutually inclusive, structural assimilation and cultural assimilation.[6] Structural assimilation measures the extent of participation of groups and individuals in a larger society, basically at the institutional level. Cultural assimilation is concerned with the process of value orientation and identification of immigrants. Clearly, one can participate in a structural sense without altering core values and orientations. For example, Moslems can, and do, actively participate in French society but do not necessarily accept the basic values of (Gallic) French life.

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[1] See, Jacques (2006) for a discussion of growing intolerance in Western countries towards some segments of their own society and the rest of the world and Prins and Salisbury (2008) who claim multiculturalism in Britain is weakening national resolve and harming national defense efforts.

[2] The British Secretary of State for Communities, Ruth Kelly, spoke in November 2006, about the need for 'honest debate about integration and cohesion in the UK' and was closely followed by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, who declared that liberal values had to be defended from a 'new and virulent ideology associated with a minority of our Muslim minority'.

[3] See, Entzinger, H. And Biezeveld, R. (2003) for a comparative discussion of integration by immigrants into some European Countries.

[4] See a discussion on this issue in *The Guardian* (2006).

[5] For a discussion of this view see Hall (1999).

As a result, to some the core problem with assimilation (both benign and severe) is the belief that involvement in institutional life will engender identification with majority views and values. This realization has led to some countries abandoning attempts at assimilation and moving toward the introduction of policies that allow separate development, within the overarching framework of a common institutional, legal and economic framework.

The UK, at least at the level of Government policy, when down this path in the 1960's with the then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, proclaiming that integration is 'not a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance'[7].

However, neither the quasi-assimilation countries nor the quasi- multi-cultural countries, or those in between, factored in the impact on their policies of the mass migration from persons of different language, ethnicity and religion that has occurred in Europe over the past two decades. Specifically, those countries that favoured assimilation faced the daunting problem of inducing large number of persons, in years to come possibly a numerical majority, to adopt the current mainstream values and cultures, particularly where these values were diametrically opposed to their own set of social and religious beliefs. Similarly, the multi-culturalists were faced with a problem that a policy which legally enshrines respect for individual also may provide a mechanism for pursuing separate development and the balkanization of the population. The impetus given to these types of consideration post 9/11 has led to a re-awakening of a debate on immigration that many had thought had been completed decades earlier.

In 2003 the EU commission was so concerned about the lack of common approaches to the immigration issue in Europe that they commissioned a study into the degree of integration currently practiced in the EU by the member states[8].

Similarly, scholars in many European countries investigated the numerous currents of debate into an appropriate immigration policy for Europe.

This paper does not directly answer this question but it addresses a related query: who are the people in Western countries who think that immigrants should integrate culturally, and how do they differ from those who think that immigrants should preserve a separate cultural existence? Although there is a vast literature on immigrants living in the West, and on immigration to Western countries, this question, to the best of our knowledge, has not been addressed in any systematic manner[9]. This study exploits a unique set of data provided by The Human Beliefs and Values Survey (HBVS) for the period 1999-2002, described in Ingelhart *et. al*., 2004. The HBVS asked over 30,000 respondents in 18 Western countries whether they thought it better that immigrants should 'maintain their distinct customs and traditions' or that they 'take over the customs of the country'. In addition, the HBVS contained a wealth of information on the attributes and circumstances of the respondents – *inter alia* their political orientation, attitude to immigrants, sex, age, income, social class, labour market and marital status, education level. We used these data, in conjunction with the data on responses, to identify - and to estimate the strength of - those factors which led people to favour integration, over multiculturalism as a basis for immigration policy.

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[6] This distinction was first made by Gordon (1964) and Hoffman-Nowotny (1970).

[7] See, The Guardian (2006).

[8] See, Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003).

2. Multiculturalism and Differing National Responses

Rex and Singh (2003) outline two polar opposite views of multiculturalism. The 'soft view' is illustrated in the approving phrase often used by politicians. 'We now live in a multicultural society'. By this statement multiculturalism is seen as a natural extension of liberal democracy and the democratic values of tolerance and respect for diversity. Conversely, the 'hard view' sees multiculturalism, with its emphasis on the group over the individual, as a threat to liberal democratic values (Barry, 1999) and by extension the view that 'economic migrants or political migrants and refugees may be seen as endangering the unity of society' (Rex and Singh, 2003 p.4). A 'middle view' sees multiculturalism, or at least the acknowledgement and toleration of a variety of cultural expressions as one, possibly the only, feasible means for the Western nations to cope with the issues raised by globalization, mass immigration and the growth of large and increasing vocal ethnic minorities within their borders. All of these views may be seen, to varying degrees within different European countries. Britain is often seen as having the most developed form of multiculturalism in that, under official policy at least, the British advocate a society that extends equitable status to distinct cultural and religious groups with no one's culture predominating. UK law allows for the extension of legal recognition to specific minority groups such as Black, White and Muslim and even special legal protections for the members of these groups[10]. Conversely, France is often perceived as main proponent of assimilation of the European nations[11]. The French system in its harshest form presumes a loss of many characteristics of the absorbed group. Legally, all citizens are simply recognized as citizens, as opposed to 'French Arabs' for example. In between these two extremes come the policies of Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. Under the German system (Gastarbeider) immigrants, independent of their length of stay, are treated as guest workers and denied citizenship**.** The Dutch response to cultural diversity has been referred to as pillarisation under which separate education, separate trade unions, and separate media has grown up, firstly for Catholics and Protestants but later extended to immigrants. Rath (1991) claims that this has led to 'minorisation' and singling out migrants for unequal treatment. In Sweden, the provision for ethnic minorities was conceived of as part of the provisions of the Welfare State (Rex and Singh, 2003).

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[9] See *inter alia*: Card (2005) on the successful assimilation of post-1965 immigrants to the USA; Borooah and Mangan (2007) on the assimilation of immigrants in Australia; Polachek *et. al.* (2006) on the economics of immigration and social diversity and Hanson (2005) on the divisive effects of immigration in the USA.

[10] See report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000).

[11] Withol de Wenden (2003) speaks of the Jacobin Tradition in France, dating back to the French revolution, which has opposed the right to be different, pluralism and group rights.

There are however signs that 'official policies' are changing and converging on models which are both politically expedient and able to cope with the reality that most countries are multi-ethnic. These changes are either in response to international events or shifts in public sentiment. In Britain, the stridently multicultural Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000), was very quickly tempered by the calls for 'Building Cohesive Communities' (2001) and a quest for 'Britishness' (Singh, 2003).

Wihtol de Wenden (2003) argues that 'In France, like most democracies, the rise of claims for difference means that the republican model of integration has no other choice but to integrate with multiculturalism' (p.77). Even in those nations that helped define Multiculturalism, Canada and Australia, there is a recognition that multiculturalism has been imposed from the top and that official policy has often run ahead of popular opinion. For example, Castles (1997) argues, from an Australian point of view, that multiculturalism has developed in a top down and ad hoc way as a strategy for integrating immigrant communities into a basically unchanged society.

Politicians and policy makers therefore face a dilemma. In Europe in particular, the existence of very well established ethnic minorities, some of which are tipped to become majorities in the not too distant future, and an increasing reliance on immigration as a source of labour within an aging domestic population make the imposition of a purely assimilation solution highly impractical. On the other hand there are clear signs that full multiculturalism, needs to be reigned back or face a widespread political and social backlash.

As well, there are differences between the official national policy on immigration and the views of the effected populations. Not all French favour assimilation and not all British are multicultural, but can we establish whether the French people in their views are essentially assimilationist and the British essentially multicultural, and if so are inter-country differences in views caused primarily by attribute effects (for example, does Italy have more persons with right wing views than Spain?) or coefficient effects (are Spanish right-wingers more strident in their integrationist views than Italian right-wingers?).

Ideally Governments should attempt to design public policies that not only serve national interests but are also compatible with the views of the domestic populations. The analysis of data from the Human Values and Beliefs Survey is one way of assessing if this type of compatibility is currently taking place in Europe. An analysis of the survey makes for interesting comparisons with 'official attitudes' as expressed in the EU (2003) report on 'Benchmarking Integration in Europe'.

3. Data and Estimation

Table 1 shows the proportions of respondents in 18 Western countries, who favoured either assimilation or multiculturalism. Respondents from Austria (82 percent), Belgium (72 percent), Denmark (77 percent), Germany (78 percent), Iceland (73 percent), and the Netherlands (70 percent) were most in favour of immigrants being absorbed into the host culture. On the other hand, the majority of respondents in the Mediterranean countries – Greece (77 percent), Italy (60 percent), Malta (55 percent) and Spain (52%) favoured multiculturalism. In order to estimate the effects of the different respondent attributes, on the likelihood of respondents regarding it as preferable that immigrants integrate, we estimated a logit equation whose dependent variable took the value 1 if a respondent thought it better that an immigrant should adopt the customs of the host country and the value 0 if he/she thought it preferable that immigrants should maintain their own distinct culture and traditions. The estimation results from this model are shown in Table 2 with a positive (negative) coefficient implying that the probability of the outcome (‘regarding integration as preferable’) would increase (decrease) with an increase in the value of the associated variable. Shown alongside each coefficient is the implied change in the probability of the outcome, consequent upon a change in value of the variable, the values of the other variables held constant at their mean values. These are the *marginal probabilities* associated with the different variables; for discrete variables – as are all the explanatory variables used - the marginal probabilities refer to changes consequent upon a move from the residual category for that variable to the category in question.

From the results of Table 2 it is possible to paint a portrait of those who thought that integration was preferable to multiculturalism. Respondents who expressed ambivalence to assisting immigrants, for example those who said they *might* or *migh*t not help immigrants, were much more likely to demand integration - by respectively, 16 and 25 percentage points - than those who expressed a clear willingness to help immigrants. Similarly, those who were opposed to having an immigrant for a neighbour, or those who regarded maintaining order in society as the most important social goal, were more likely to support integration than, respectively, those who were prepared to have immigrant neighbors or those who thought that, compared to preserving order, other social aims were more important (by 10 and 7 percentage points respectively). In terms of social class, classes C1 and C2 were more likely to support integration – by respectively – 3 and 4 percentage points – than either the highest (A-B) or lowest social classes (D-E).

Conversely, people who regarded themselves as politically left-wing or as middle-of-the-road were less likely - by respectively, 10 and 2 percentage points - to support integration than those who thought of themselves as right-wing; young persons (15-29 years) and middle-aged persons (30-49 years) were less likely - by respectively, 9 and 6 percentage points - to support integration than those who were 50 years or older; people with children were more likely to support integration, by 5 percentage points, compared to childless persons; those with a high level of education were less likely to support integration, compared to the moderately well educated or the poorly educated, by 7 percentage points. In terms of labour market status, compared to retired and employed persons, the unemployed (by 7 percentage points), students (by 7 percentage points), and housewives (by 3 percentage points) were less likely to support integration.

Using the above results one can build profiles of those who are most likely to, respectively, support cultural integration and multiculturalism. The probability of persons supporting cultural assimilation was 85 percent if they: (i) did not believe in helping immigrants; (ii) would not want an immigrant for a neighbour; (iii) believed in the primacy of order in society as a social goal; (v) regarded themselves as politically right-wing (vi) were aged 50 yrs or more and retired. At the other extreme, the probability of persons supporting cultural assimilation was only 25 percent if they: (i) did believe in helping immigrants; (ii) would not object to an immigrant for a neighbour; (iii) did not believe in the primacy of order in society as a social goal; (v) regarded themselves as politically left-wing; and (vi) were students aged 15-29 years. Finally, acceptance of multiculturalism rose with higher levels of formal education. Based on these results it is possible to see a process where differences in the composition of the respective populations may provide an explanation for apparent national differences in attitudes to multiculturalism. But do differences based purely on nationality also emerge?

4. Country Effects versus Personal Characteristics

Table 2 shows that, even after controlling for personal characteristics, there were significant country effects: *ceteris paribus* respondents in some countries (Austria, France and Germany) were more likely to regard assimilation as preferable to multiculturalism than respondents in other countries (Italy, Portugal, Spain). However, Table 2 traces country effects purely through intercept shifts and holds the slope coefficients (which reflect attitude intensity) as being invariant across countries. If the equation had been estimated separately for the different countries then we would be able to decompose the overall level of difference into two distinct components; First, countries might differ in terms of their attributes: for example, one country might have more right-wing respondents than another. Second, countries might differ in terms of their coefficients: right-wing respondents in one country might be more pro-assimilation compared to right-wing respondents in another country.

In order to disentangle the relative strengths of ‘attribute differences’ and ‘coefficient differences’ in explaining the overall difference, we divided the countries into two groups: ‘Northern Europe’, with a large proportion of respondents favouring cultural assimilation (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden) and ‘Southern Europe’, with a smaller proportion, sometimes a minority, of respondents favouring assimilation (Italy, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, Ireland, and Northern Ireland). The ‘assimilation equation’, shown in Table 2, was then estimated separately for the ‘North’ and the ‘South’ groups of countries and these estimates are shown in Table 3; lastly, these estimates were used to decompose the difference between the North and the South, in the average proportion of their respondents who favoured assimilation, into a part caused by attribute differences and a residual part engendered by coefficient differences.

The column headed 'sample average' in Table 4 shows that 70.8 percent of respondents from the North and 43.1 percent of respondents from the South regarded cultural assimilation as preferable to multiculturalism: a difference of 27.7 percentage points. So, compared to respondents from the South, Northern respondents had an 'assimilation surplus'.

Partly, this may have had to do with the fact that the coefficient responses, to a given vector of values of the 'assimilation determining' variables, were different between the countries of the 'North' and the 'South': Table 3 shows that the ordered logit estimates were, for several variables, significantly different between the two groups of countries. Partly, however, this may be due to the fact that the attribute vectors were different between the Northern and Southern countries. This section assesses the proportions of the overall difference in satisfaction levels between Western and non-Western countries which were caused by, respectively, 'coefficient' and 'attribute' differences[12].

To facilitate this analysis it is useful to assign northern coefficients to the attributes of southern respondents and compare with the original southern results and, reverse the exercise by assigning southern coefficients to northern respondents.

The next column of Table 4 shows that *if the attributes of Southern respondents had been evaluated at 'Northern' coefficients*, 68.2 percent of respondents from countries of the South would prefer cultural assimilation over multiculturalism: only 2.6 percentage points *below* the average proportion of 70.8 percent for the Northern respondents. Consequently, of the overall difference of 27.7 percentage points between Northern and Southern countries, in their respective proportions preferring cultural assimilation to multiculturalism, 2.6 percentage points, or 9 percent, could be explained by attribute differences between the two groups, the remainder (91 percent) being due to coefficient differences.

On an alternative decomposition, *if the attributes of Northern respondents had been evaluated at 'Southern' coefficients*, 46.3 percent of respondents from countries of the North would prefer cultural assimilation over multiculturalism: only 3.2 percentage points *above* the average proportion of 43.1 percent for the South. Consequently, on this alternative decomposition, of the overall difference of 27.7 percentage points between Northern and Southern countries, in their respective proportions preferring cultural assimilation to multiculturalism, only 3.2 percentage points, or 11 percent, could be explained by attribute differences between the two groups, the remainder (89 percent) being due to coefficient differences. On average, therefore, only 10 percent of the overall difference of 27.7 percentage points between Northern and Southern countries, in their respective proportions preferring cultural assimilation to multiculturalism was due to differences between them in their attributes, 90 percent being explained by differences between them in their responses to a given set of attributes. Overall, the large bulk of differences in views were not caused by compositional differences amongst the populations, but by different levels intensity in the views held on immigration across groups in the broad Northern Europe/Southern Europe breakup.

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[12] The methodology used is that of Oaxaca (1973) adapted to probabilistic models (Nielsen, 1998; Borooah and Iyer, 2005).

5. Conclusions

This paper set out to examine views on immigration policy in Europe, principally the extremes of multiculturalism versus assimilation. It asked the question: are the observed national differences in attitudes towards multiculturalism and assimilation due primarily to differences in attributes of the respective populations or differences in the coefficients of the various groups within each country? For example, do views in Germany differ from the UK because there are a higher proportion of right-wingers in Germany or because German right wingers think differently (more stridently) about immigration than British right wingers?

To answer this question, this paper undertook an inquiry into the nature of people in Western countries who thought that immigrants should assimilate into the culture of the host country and, by implication, into the nature of those who thought it best if immigrants preserved their own cultures and traditions. Having identified the personal characteristics that might make it likely that people would support one or the other camp, the paper also pointed to the existence of strong country effects: which side one supported in the assimilation versus multiculturalism debate depended not just on who you were but also on where you lived. Using a decomposition analysis, the paper showed that these inter-country differences (or, more accurately, differences between a group of countries who were strong supporters of multiculturalism and another group of countries who were less enthusiastic about multiculturalism) were largely due to differences between countries in how they *responded* to a given set attributes rather than to differences between them in their attributes. In other words, the main differences were not between middle class and working class or males and females but between nationalities, particularly when these nationalities were grouped together into Northern and Southern Europe. These results, while interesting in themselves also have significant policy implications. If attitudes to immigration policy were generically determined by attribute effects we would be able to detect and accurately forecast trends in Europe towards or against multiculturalism by using trends in predictor variables such as aging, acceptance of right wing views and the relative deepening of education. However, the results of this paper show that predictions in this area are not so simple. Differences in attitudes to immigration between the broad groups of North Europe and South Europe have been shown to be overwhelmingly determined by inter-country differences in attitudes across compositional groups. This conclusion does not sit well with the recommendations of the EU Commission into immigration (2003) who argued ‘there is a growing recognition of the need to act collectively at the EU level by adopting additional common elements and adapting old ones to new challenges’. The inevitable conclusion from our results is that the development of a unified-European policy on this important immigration question may not be easy to define or direct.

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Appendix

Table 1: Integration versus Multiculturalism in Western Countries, 1999-2000

Country: sample size	**Integration**	**Multiculturalism**
Austria: 1,404	82	18
Belgium: 1,708	72	28
Denmark: 837	77	23
Finland: 924	67	33
France: 1,439	74	26
Germany:1,869	78	22
Greece: 1,031	23	77
Iceland: 896	73	27
Ireland: 873	43	57
Italy: 1,763	40	60
Luxembourg: 1,013	40	60
Malta: 929	45	55
Netherlands: 913	70	30
Portugal: 841	53	47
Spain: 950	48	52
Sweden: 805	64	36
Great Britain: 836	55	45
Northern Ireland: 827	*47*	*53*
All Western Countries: 19,858	**60**	**40**

Source: The Human Beliefs and Values Survey: Ingelhart *et. al*., 2004.

Table 2: Logit Esitmates of the Integration Model[*]

Determining Variables	**Coefficient estimates**	**Marginal Probabilities**
Would *perhaps* help immigrants	0.676***	.157***
	(15.37)	
Would *not* help immigrants	1.187***	.252***
	(22.20)	
Sympathises, to some extent, with immigrants	0.349***	.079***
	(5.22)	
Does not sympathise with immigrants	0.293***	.067***
	(2.96)	
Religion: very important, rather important	-0.174***	-.041***
	(4.70)	
Would not want immigrant as neighbour	0.453***	.102***
	(8.02)	
Female	0.001	.000
	(0.02)	
Associates with other people regularly	0.044	.010
	(0.91)	
Believes that maintaining order in the nation is the most important government objective	0.307***	.072***
	(8.75)	
Left-wing politically	-0.425***	-.103***
	(9.61)	
Middle-of-the-road politically	-0.084**	-.020**
	(2.20)	
Young (15-29)	-0.365***	-.088***
	(5.99)	
Middle-aged (30-49)	-0.247***	-.059***
	(5.45)	
High education	-0.304***	-.073***
	(5.94)	
Middle education	0.005	.001
	(0.12)	
Social class: A-B (upper class, upper middle class)	0.107	.025
	(1.51)	
Social class: C1 (middle, non-manual)	0.118**	.028**
	(1.97)	
Social class: C2 (middle, manual)	0.173***	.040***
	(2.94)	
Has children	0.207***	.049***
	(4.69)	
Employed	-0.064	-.015
	(1.22)	
Unemployed	-0.300***	-.073***
	(3.60)	

Student	-0.304***	-.074***
	(3.45)	
Housewife	-0.140**	-.033**
	(2.14)	
Austria	1.615***	.291***
	(14.08)	
Belgium	1.185***	.235***
	(11.79)	
Denmark	1.407***	.259***
	(11.90)	
Finland	0.953***	.194***
	(8.90)	
France	1.197***	.235***
	(11.26)	
Germany	1.358***	.260***
	(12.50)	
Greece	-0.734***	-.181***
	(6.64)	
Iceland	1.359***	.254***
	(12.39)	
Ireland	0.137	.032
	(1.30)	
Italy	-0.099	-.024
	(0.98)	
Luxembourg	-0.204*	-.049*
	(1.81)	
Malta	-0.003	-.001
	(0.03)	
The Netherlands	1.345***	.252***
	(12.45)	
Portugal	0.428***	.096***
	(4.09)	
Spain	0.189*	.044*
	(1.72)	
Sweden	1.203***	.232***
	(10.36)	
Great Britain	0.252**	.058**
	(2.20)	
Constant	-0.695***	
	(6.56)	
Observations	19071	

Notes to Table 2:
* Dependent variable = 1, if respondent thinks integration is preferable to multiculturalism = 0, if respondent thinks multiculturalism is preferable to integration
1. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
3. Residual categories are: (i) Would help immigrants (ii) Sympathises with immigrants; (iii) religion not very important or not at all important (iv) Male; (v) Old (50+ years); (vi) Right wing politically; (vii) Low level of education; (viii) Retired; (ix) social class D-E (manual, unskilled); (x) Northern Ireland.

Table 3: Logit Esitmates of the Integration Model[*]: Northern and Southern Countries[**]

Determining Variables	**Coefficient estimates: Northern Countries**	**Coefficient estimates: Southern Countries**
Would *perhaps* help immigrants	0.811***	0.496***
	(14.61)	(7.70)
Would *not* help immigrants	1.321***	0.955***
	(19.16)	(12.37)
Sympathises, to some extent, with immigrants	0.447***	-0.018
	(5.50)	(0.17)
Does not sympathise with immigrants	0.475***	-0.011
	(3.56)	(0.07)
Religion: very important, rather important	-0.195***	-0.192***
	(4.20)	(3.55)
Would not want immigrant as neighbour	0.466***	0.330***
	(5.28)	(4.62)
Female	0.077*	-0.080
	(1.66)	(1.49)
Associates with other people regularly	-0.558***	0.067
	(10.49)	(1.00)
Believes that maintaining order in the nation is the most important government objective	0.377***	0.135***
	(8.29)	(2.62)
Left-wing politically	-0.413***	-0.356***
	(7.19)	(5.30)
Middle-of-the-road politically	-0.062	-0.070
	(1.19)	(1.30)
Young (15-29)	-0.296***	-0.471***
	(3.67)	(5.20)
Middle-aged (30-49)	-0.246***	-0.263***
	(4.07)	(3.96)
High education	-0.230***	-0.590***
	(3.68)	(7.48)
Middle education	0.025	-0.107*
	(0.46)	(1.81)
Social class: A-B (upper class, upper middle class)	0.203***	0.193**
	(2.81)	(2.03)

Social class: C1 (middle, non-manual)	0.267***	0.175***
	(4.56)	(2.62)
Social class: C2 (middle, manual)	0.202***	0.156**
	(3.34)	(2.30)
Has children	0.292***	0.143**
	(4.99)	(2.20)
Employed	-0.150**	-0.069
	(2.22)	(0.89)
Unemployed	-0.252**	-0.277**
	(2.26)	(2.25)
Student	-0.363***	-0.388***
	(3.23)	(2.79)
Housewife	-0.266***	-0.120
	(2.78)	(1.36)
Constant	0.315***	-0.248**
	(3.09)	(2.16)
Observations	11301	7770

Notes to Table 3:

* Dependent variable = 1, if respondent thinks integration is preferable to multiculturalism = 0, if respondent thinks multiculturalism is preferable to integration.

** Northern countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden.

Southern Countries: Italy, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, Ireland, and Northern Ireland.

1. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
3. Residual categories are: (i) Would help immigrants (ii) Sympathises with immigrants; (iii) religion not very important or not at all important (iv) Male; (v) Old (50+ years); (vi) Right wing politically; (vii) Low level of education; (viii) Retired; (ix) social class D-E (manual, unskilled).

Table 4: The Decomposition of Differences Between North and South European Countries in the Proportions of Their Respondents Wanting Cultural Integration

Sample Average	***Non-Western attributes evaluated using Western coefficient estimates***	
$\overline{P}^{N} - \overline{P}^{S}$	$P(\mathbf{X}^{\mathbf{N}},\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^{\mathbf{N}})$ $-P(\mathbf{X}^{\mathbf{S}},\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^{\mathbf{N}})$	$P(\mathbf{X}^{\mathbf{S}},\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^{\mathbf{N}})$ $-P(\mathbf{X}^{\mathbf{S}},\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^{\mathbf{S}})$
0.708 - 0.431 = 0.277	**0.708 - 0.682 = 0.026**	**0.682- 0.431 = 0.251**
Sample Average	***Western attributes evaluated using non-Western coefficient estimates***	
+++++ $\overline{P}^{N} - \overline{P}^{S}$	$P(\mathbf{X}^{\mathbf{N}},\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^{\mathbf{S}})$ $-P(\mathbf{X}^{\mathbf{S}},\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^{\mathbf{S}})$	$P(\mathbf{X}^{N},\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^{N})$ $-P(\mathbf{X}^{N},\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^{SW})$
0.708 - 0.431 = -0.277	**0.463-0.431=0.032**	**0.708-0.463=0.245**